Diversionary role of conflicts in Eastern Ukraine and Georgia: war at Russian frontiers as source of presidential power - Статья

New York University, USA DIVERSIONARY ROLE OF CONFLICTS IN EASTERN UKRAINE AND GEORGIA: WAR AT RUSSIAN FRONTIERS AS SOURCE OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER A. Vlasenko Two recent armed conflicts in Georgia in 2008 and Eastern Ukraine in 2014 threatened stability in the immediate neighborhood of the Russian Federation. These military disputes led to increased political and strategic confrontation among the former republics of the USSR, dangers to economic growth and establishment of democratic institutions in all participating countries, as well as to devastating civilian casualties and displacements in both Georgia and Ukraine. These armed conflicts once more illustrated the level of dependency of these states on Russia’s interests and the ability of the latter to employ coercion to achieve its goals. To understand what kind of warfare repertoire should be expected from Russia it is necessary to know the incentives of parties in the armed conflict. I argue that by looking at economic problems, public support of the leadership, as well as power relations within the state, it is possible to explain the repertoires of its involvement into conflicts in neighboring states. Such illumination of conflict’s roots might help to develop effective defense strategies, making weaker states more capable of protecting their borders. Therefore, the research question is the following: How did the Russian Federation’s goals of participation in the armed conflicts in Eastern Ukraine in 2014 and Georgia in 2008 influence the warfare repertoires in each case? More specifically, the research is focused on the comparative study of the incentives of Russian involvement in armed conflicts in Eastern Ukraine in 2014 and Georgia in 2008. The investigation is aimed at illumination of the goals of Russian government in each case with regard to both geopolitical and domestic reasons. Elucidation of linkages between these goals and the intensity and duration of military confrontation will help answer the research question. The research will be concentrated on testing the following hypothesis: H1: The government’s willingness to increase the public support and divert its attention from domestic issues is inversely proportional to the intensity of armed conflicts at its frontiers. In other words, if the governments interest in diverting public attention from domestic problems is high, the war will be conducted at slow pace, with low intensity, and limited engagement of troops. In such a way, public attention will be diverted during long period of time (mass-media and government will focus public attention on foreign, rather than domestic problems), whereas losses and casualties of war will be limited and, thus, will not provoke negative attitudes among society. On the other hand, so-called war in Donbas (Eastern Ukraine) currently lasts for more than 8 months and is characterized by low intensity. Thus, these two cases are particularly suitable for the purposes of this research, which aims to show correlation between Russian domestic problems in two respective years and the mode of military confrontation, applied by the Russian army in two cases. Figure 1. Main economic indicators General economic growth in the Russian Federation was much higher in 2008 than in 2014. The main economic indicators, such as GDP growth, fixed capital investment, nominal exchange rate, export and import of goods, as well as savings at reserve fund, national wealth fund and reserve (including gold) were significantly higher in 2008 than in 2014.