Исследование ожиданий России от Китая в период после введения санкций. Стремление России к более активному участию Китая в энергетической, финансовой и технологической сферах. Волатильность рубля, санкции, политическая нестабильность и кризис в России.
Аннотация к работе
ФЕДЕРАЛЬНОЕ ГОСУДАРСТВЕННОЕ АВТОНОМНОЕ ОБРАЗОВАТЕЛЬНОЕ УЧРЕЖДЕНИЕ ВЫСШЕГО ОБРАЗОВАНИЯ Поворот России на Восток: российское восприятие китайской политики в отношении Москвы после украинского кризиса по направлению 41.04.03 «Востоковедение и африканистика» студента образовательной программыЦелью данной работы является исследование ожиданий России от Китая в период после введения санкций и насколько эти ожидания оправдались и как менялось последующее восприятие политики КНР в отношении РФ в самой РФ между 2014 и 2016 годами. Гипотезой данной работы является: стремление России к более активному участию Китая в энергетической, финансовой и технологической сферах не оправдало своих ожиданий изза волатильности рубля, санкций, политической нестабильности и экономического кризиса в России. Более того, Китай не смог предоставить современное буровое оборудование в кротчайшие сроки, как ожидалось в Москве. санкция россия китай кризис The present paper explores the expectations of the Russian Federation from People’s Republic of China in the process of “Russia’s pivot to Asia” and subsequent investigation of how the perception of the policy of the People’s Republic of China in relation to the Russian Federation changed in Russia between 2014 and 2016. This research addressed the following hypothesis: Russia’s ambitions of greater involvement with China in the field of energy, finance and technology have failed to meet its expectations because of ruble volatility, sanctions, political instability and the economic crisis in Russia.1.2 Economic and trade relations between Russia and China from 1993 to 2013 1.3 Cultural Relations between Russia and China 1.5 Russia’s pivot to China2.1 Research Method3.1 Results of empirical study of Russia"s Turn to the East: Russian Expectations and perception of Chinese Policy Towards Moscow Since the Ukraine Crisis 3.2 How the perception of the policy of the People’s Republic of China in relation to the Russian Federation changed in Russia between 2014 and 2016IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCHIt is out of the questions that Russia and China besides the US are two of the biggest players on the global arena and international system, moreover, strategic partnership of both countries already has tangible geopolitical weight. However, the greatness of each country is represented in different ways; China is experiencing its rise through economic development while Russia still remains a military superpower. In spite of assistance that China is providing for Russia right now, it can be easily limited as China is scarcely to undertake any performance that would seriously contradict sanctions imposed by the West on the Russian Federation. Moreover, the author of this paper will focus on how the perception of policy of the People’s Republic of China in relation to the Russian Federation changed in Russia between 2014 and 2016. The goal of the present study is to determine and investigate the expectations of the Russian Federation from People’s Republic of China in the process of “Russia’s pivot to Asia” and explore how the perception of the policy of the People’s Republic of China in relation to the Russian Federation changed in Russia between 2014 and 2016.Finally, the author will focus on “Russia’s pivot to China” and main realms of collaboration between Russia and China. Already in 1991, a trading agreement between Russia and China was signed, the agreement that made Russia “Most Favoured Nation” with respect to trade with China. Nevertheless, we can see that trade with China constituted significant part of Russia’s overall trade, however, as to China, trade with Russia comprised small share of its overall trade worldwide. However, Russia’s accession to the WTO made some troubles for China as according to WTO rules, countries that are members of that organization should open up for free trade, thus throwing up additional challenges and competition for China, as market share should be divided among other countries that are willing to invest in Russia too. Taking everything mentioned above into account, realizing that Sino-Russian trade has grown significantly from 1993, thus, making China one of the top partners for Russia, but it is worth mentioning that the European Union is in a way greater partner for Russia with regard to trade, comprising 43% of imports coming to Russia in 2010 in comparison with 18% coming from China and Russian exports to EU amounted 49% comparing to 5% going to China of Russia’s total exports (ibid).To sum up the main points of this chapter, Russia’s turn to China was accelerated because of worsening of the relations between Russia and the Western bloc, namely the European Union and the United States of America. However, taking into account that sanctions imposed by the West speeded up Russia’s pivot to Asia, officially, the turn to Asia was announced in 2013 by Russian president Vladimir Putin.